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Abstract 
The structure of a gasoline market can be an important element in the pricing 
choices of its participants.  However, structure is often measured only indirectly 
by, for example, the number of independent sellers, or by seller density.  Here we 
present a more direct and literal way of exploring market structure by representing 
it as a network.  We use the structure of the network to delineate submarkets and 
present some measures from mathematical sociology which can be used to 
summarise aspects of network structure for use in further analysis.  Although our 
case study here is in retail gasoline markets, the approach has broader application 




Retail Gasoline Markets as Networks 
1. Introduction 
In markets like retail gasoline, an individual outlet might compete most with its 
nearest neighbours, but movements in prices can ripple across the whole market 
through the links those neighbours have with outlets further away and so on.  This 
leads us to consider such a market as a network, and to use this network to 
delineate submarkets and describe the structure of competition.  In this paper, we 
show how a simple model of bilateral interconnection can be used to create a 
network, summarising market structure, and how thatnetwork can be cut into 
submarkets which we then test for price similarity.  Finally, we describe some 
measures, common in mathematical sociology, which can be used to summarise 
network structure from the perspective of each of its members, and thus be used 
in further analysis.  We illustrate our approach using the retail gasoline market of 
Perth, Western Australia, for which excellent data are available. 
          Section Two of the paper outlines the approach in general.  Section Three 
provides an overview of the case study market of Perth, Western Australia.  
Section Four outlines the process by which bilateral ties are formed to create the 
market network.  Section Five indicates how this network is cut into distinct sub-
networks, and shows how these are tested to ascertain whether the resultant 
summaries of prices are realistic or not.  Section Six concludes with some final 
thoughts on the broader applicability of this model. 
2. Outlining the Approach 
The approach we follow can be described as follows: 
• Develop a behavioural rule for local interaction: This specifies who is 
connected to whom.  We present one such rule in our case study, but the latter 
steps do not depend upon this rule, potentially givin  our approach 
widespread application.   
• Draw the network: The network is simply a collection of all of the bilateral 
ties found by following the rule in the first step.  It can be represented 
graphically or, more usefully, as an adjacency matrix (see below).   
• Cut the network: Here we use the network structure to determine appropriate 
ways to cut the network into submarkets.  This contrasts with the arbitrary 
approaches often used in economics, such as defining local markets by 
reference to town, suburb or zip-code, or by using a defined radius around the 
firm in question.   
• Test the cuts: Finally, we present a series of tests by which we establish 
whether the division of submarkets is reasonable.  The test is not a necessary 
step, but it is useful to perform prior to using summary statistics describing the 
 
submarkets in any further analysis, to prevent erroneous results from arising 
due to poor submarket definition.     
 
          Before outlining our approach in more detail, we provide some information 
on the case study; the Perth retail gasoline market.  
3. The Perth Case Study 
The data used here come from Perth, Western Australia, which is governed by a 
unique regulatory regime known as FuelWatch.  Every gasoline retailer must 
report its next-day price to the regulator by 2pm.  The regulator then publicises 
that price via its website and on TV, radio and other media.  The price comes into 
effect at 6am the next day, and must remain in effect for 24 hours.  Quite apart 
from the effect this regulatory regime has on strategy (see Wang, 2009), or the 
influence it may or may not have had on the price level (see Davidson, 2008, for 
an account of this controversy), it provides for the researcher a uniquely 
comprehensive dataset which comprises a census of all prices in Perth.   
          Considerable data on the Perth market, and on retail petroleum in Australia 
in general, can be found in the various recent reports by the ACCC (2007, 2008, 
2009).  Here, we focus on the period from January 1st 2003 to March 14th 2004.  
The start-date is chosen as data on wholesale or terminal gate prices (the proxy for 
the marginal cost of retailers) are unavailable before this date, and the end-date is 
chosen because the following day marked the conversion of some 40 Shell outlets 
into Coles Express outlets through the joint venture between Coles and Shell.  The 
data do not cover all outlets in Perth, omitting some on the outskirts of the city, 
those for which the data series are incomplete (usually because they are new, or 
were closed for long periods during the sample period owing to a change in 
ownership) and those for which the retailing of fuel is not a core business (such as 
taxi depots and marinas).  Data on demand come fromthe ABS Census (ABS, 
2006) whilst the remaining data come from FuelWatch, or are based on data on 
station characteristics in the FuelWatch database.1 
          Table One provides information on branding, ownership structures, 








                                                
1 The authors would like to thank the FuelWatch regulator for making this dataset available. 
 
Branding 
  Total With Convenience Store 
Ownership 
BP 52 16 Branded Independent 23 
Caltex  57 29 Company Controlled 99 
Woolworths 4  Distributor Controlled 2 
Gull 27  Independent 2 
Independent 2  Larger Independent 37 
Liberty 5  Price Supported 42 
Mobil 13 11 Supermarket 4 
Peak 13  
Shell 35 8 
Wesco 1  
  
 
Competitors Within 5km Distance to Nearest Competitor 
Number of competitors Frequency Distance (km) Frequency 
up to 2 10 up to 0.4 38 
3 or 4 16 0.41 to 0.8 38 
5 or 6 31 0.81 to 1.2 41 
7 or 8 35 1.21 to 1.6 35 
9 or 10 43 1.61 to 2 39 
11 or 12 37 2.01 to 2.4 8 
13 or 14 13 2.41 to 2.8 5 
15 or 16 17 2.81 to 3.2 2 
> 16 7 > 3.2 3 
Table One: Perth Market Summary 
 
          Caltex has the largest market share, followed by BP and Shell.  Mobil, the 
fourth of the Majors (vertically integrated, multi-national firms active in refining, 
wholesale and retail in Australia), has a much smaller market share.  Independent 
chains (Gull, Liberty and Peak) make up roughly a qu rter of the sample, making 
them collectively more important than either Shell or Mobil and slightly smaller 
than BP.  Supermarkets are more prevalent today than in the dataset, which 
precedes the entry of Coles, and is from a time when only small numbers of 
Woolworths outlets existed.2  Today, the two comprise almost half of overall Fuel 
sales in Australia (ACCC, 2007). 
          Company controlled outlets comprise roughly half of those in Table Two, 
according to FuelWatch, which defines outlets owned directly by the Majors and 
                                                
2 Coles and Woolworths are the two major grocery retail rs in Australia.   
 
outlets owned by their multi-site franchisees as being company controlled.  In 
Western Australia, Shell owns eight sites, BP owns five and Mobil none.  Thus, 
most of the outlets listed as company controlled in Table One are owned by one 
of the multi-site franchisees of these brands.  Caltex has no multi-site franchises 
due to the terms of its 1995 merger with Ampol (see Walker & Woodward, 1996, 
for details).  Instead, it uses single site franchises and a price-support scheme 
described in detail in Wang (2009). 
          Convenience stores attached to retail petroleum outlets are often an 
important source of profits for the brands which own them.  Caltex has two 
convenience store brands, whilst Shell, Mobil and BP have one apiece.  Most 
Mobil outlets have a convenience store attached, as do around two-thirds of 
Caltex outlets.  The shares for BP and Shell are each less than one-third.  None of 
the independent brands has a convenience store brand, though some (Gull in 
particular) sell convenience store items in many of its outlets. 
          Although Perth is a relatively low-density city, retail petroleum outlets tend 
to be located along highways or at the major shopping centres which exist in the 
suburbs.  This is in part due to zoning laws and in part due to a desire to be 
located at nodes of demand.  For this reason, distances to the nearest rival tends to 
be low (on average just over one km) and the number of competitors within five 
kilometres is nine.3  
          Table Two summarises the demand data, showing city-wide averages and 


















                                                
3 Distances between each pair of outlets were calculated manually using en electronic version of 
the Perth street directory.  All distances were calcul ted based on the shortest distance by road. 
 
  Lower Bound Average Upper Bound 
Median family Income 1321.5133 1362.7889 1404.0645 
Average Household size 2.4503018 2.4922705 2.5342392 
Number aboriginal 312.46014 362.88406 413.30798 
Number persons 19931.575 21479.348 23027.121 
Number born overseas 7627.2796 8243.0386 8858.7977 
Number of families with dependent children 2360.4874 2569.7826 2779.0778 
Number of families with Single Mother 817.59251 896.27536 974.95822 
Number of families 5295.9837 5731.7971 6167.6105 
Av Number vehicles per household 1.4479305 1.468148 1.4883671 
Dwelling density (houses per sq km) 431.34798 468.12804 504.90811 
Number of rented dwellings 1830.5952 1969.9517 2109.3081 
Number of state housing dwellings 265.2835 308.80676 352.33003 
Number of dwellings 7355.8529 7889.7585 8423.664 
number with post-school qualification 6566.6349 7041.1932 7515.7516 
Number employed 9735.9579 10502.449 11268.941 
Number using public transport for work travel 861.123 4 915.24638 969.36962 
Source: ABS (2006) 
Table Two: Demand-Side Characteristics 
 
          One of the most important characteristics of prices in Perth’s retail 
petroleum market is that they cycle in an Edgeworth (1925) fashion.  Wang 
(2009) provides considerable detail in regards to such cycles in Perth, and Maskin 
& Tirole (1988) provide the theoretical underpinnings of this dynamic 
equilibrium.  To explore price cycles in more detail, we perform an auto-spectral 
analysis on the prices of each outlet,4 following the approach outlined in Granger 
& Hatanaka (1964) and construct a spectrogram for prices and margins, dividing 
the spectra into 42 different frequency bands.5  The auto-spectral analysis 
underpins the cross-coherency analysis discussed below.  
          The resulting spectrogram for margins is hown in Figure One.  The results 
for price are similar, but those for margins are clarer as marginal costs (which 
contribute little to variation) have been removed.  The red lines indicate Caltex or 
Ampol-branded stations, green indicates BP, orange i dicates Shell, light blue 
indicates Mobil, and dark blue indicates all of the non-Major branded and 
independent outlets.  The thick black line shows the average power for each 
frequency band. 
 
                                                
4 Spectral analysis requires the data to be stationary and we find that they are. 
5 Chatfield (2006) suggests the use of, M=2√N is common in the literature, where M is the number 




































































Figure One: Spectra for Price Margins 
 
          The most obvious aspect of Figure One is the dual peak at seven and ten 
days.6  This is most pronounced for BP and Shell. It is not the case that some 
outlets follow cycles of seven days and some follow cycles of ten days; most in 
fact exhibit peaks at both frequency bands.  It is this dual peak which is 
suggestive of the use of mixed strategies. 
          The dual peak should not be surprising.  Indeed, it is more logical than a 
single peak.  If a retail petroleum outlet consistently followed a seven day cycle, 
this would become immediately obvious to all of its rivals, each of whom could 
then underbid it on the eighth day and capture market share.   
4. Forming the Network – The Behavioural Rule 
In order to develop a network-based picture of the structure of competition in the 
retail petroleum market in Perth, one must first devis  a way in which one can 
connect two retail petroleum outlets; to show that they are in fact competing.  
These bilateral ties, when collected together, give an overall picture of the 
                                                
6 Peaks at 21, 14 and 3.5 days are echoes of the seven-day cycle, a common occurrence in 
spectrograms.  The longest period encapsulates all cycles longer than 84 days, and is thus picking 
up longer-term cycles such as changes in crude prics and seasonal variation. 
 
structure of competition in the marketplace as a whole.  Our connectivity rule is 
based upon earlier work by Hoover (1937) and McBride (1983). 
          Consider the situation of two firms, A and B, located on a section of road, 
and selling an homogenous product to homogenous consumers whose travel plans 
take them past one of the retailers but who would have to deviate from their 
chosen path to frequent the premises of the other retailer.  They would only 
choose to do so if the retailer in question had prices lower than the retailer they 
have passed (and can thus patronise at zero cost) by a margin greater than the 
travel costs associated with deviation.  Each retailer maximises profit by trading 
off the extra per-unit profits which can be made by charging higher prices to those 
consumers for whom deviating to the competing retailer is costly against the extra 
gross profits which can be made by selling to more customers if a retailer 
undercuts its rival.   
 
The trade-off can be summarised in the form of a profit function thus: 
 
( ) ( )
( )















































   (1)  
  
Where: 
pi = price charged by firm i.
qi = proportion of overall customers that pass firm . 
ci = marginal cost of firm i. 
d = distance between firm i and firm j. 
tanα = the per-unit cost of travel (cost/distance). 
 
          It is relatively simple to show (see Bloch & Wills-Johnson, 2010a) that the 
equilibrium of this dynamic game will be: 
 
( ) ( )( )BABABA
BA
qqccdqqqqp +++= 2tan23
1 222 α     (2) 
for Firm A, and  
           
( ) ( )( )BABABA
BA
qqccdqqqqp 2tan23
1 222 +++= α     (3) 
for Firm B. 
 
          In Perth, the terminal gate prices, which proxy marginal costs, are almost 
exactly the same across the five wholesalers (BP, Shell, Caltex, Mobil and Gull) 
for almost every day in the sample period.7  If one also assumes qA=qB, the 
Equilibrium is not Equation Three, but rather (for both firms): 
 
αtan2
1 2dp =         (4) 
 
          It is worth noting that this equilibrium is not stable, but rather that each firm 
has an incentive to raise its price, triggering an Edgeworth Cycle (see Bloch & 
Wills-Johnson, ibid). 
          Equation Four gives rise to a simple testof connection.  We first form the 
series of price cycle minima for each gasoline station by taking the lowest price in 
the three days prior to each price increase of greate  than five percent.8  We then 
undertake a simple statistical test of the difference between the means for each 
pair of outlets within five kilometres of one another.9  Where there is no 
statistically significant difference between the means, we deem the two outlets to 
be connected.  By collecting these connected pairs, we are able to construct a 
network which summarises the patterns of connection in the overall market. 
          The results are summarised in Figure Two (overleaf).  The blue area 
represents the Swan River, which divides the city North from South, and the grey 
line represents the main north-south freeway, which divides East from West.  
Placement of each station is approximate, but roughly correlates to the physical 
shape of the Perth market.10  The different coloured dots represent different 
brands.  Brands tend to be spread throughout the Perth market, rather than 
focussing on any particular area. 
                                                
7 The correlation coefficients between each pair of wholesalers across the period exceed 99 
percent in each case.  The ACCC (2008, 2009) finds similar close matches between the tgp 
average wholesale price in each city it studies, using actual wholesale price data which are not in 
the public domain. 
8 Looking four days prior and using different price ncreases made little difference to results; the 
increasing phase of each price cycle is quite clear in the data. 
9 The ACCC adopted this local market definition in a recent merger decision (see 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/904296), and a similar distance has been used 
to define local markets in the US literature (see Hastings, 2004 or USSPSICGA, 2002).  We use it 
as a provisional measure of local markets, to avoid having to test every possible bilateral pair in a 
collection of 208 gasoline stations. 
10 The software used to construct the networks and calculate their structural characteristics 
















          One can then summarise this network structu e by using summary statistics widely 
used in mathematical sociology, and based upon the adjacency matrix of Figure Two.11  
Commonly used summary statistics include Bonacich’s (1972, 1987) measures of 
centrality and Burt’s (1992) measures of redundancy, efficiency and constraint.  All are 
well established in the mathematical sociology litera ure, and there is a lively debate as to 
which are best in what types of network situations.  Burt (2000) or Granovetter (2005) 
contain reviews of this debate, whilst Burt (2000, 2002, 2005) contain reviews of 
empirical applications of his measures and Borgatti & Everett (2005) contains a detailed 
mathematical treatment of the relationships between th  various measures of centrality.  
We calculate these measures for both the network as a whole and for each of the sub-
markets in separate work (Bloch & Wills-Johnson, 2010b, 2010c).  Here, we focus on 
determining the relevant sub-markets; a topic to which we now turn. 
5. Cutting and Testing Sub-Markets 
We now explore the use of network structure to determine sub-markets.  In principle, 
using network structures to delineate sub-networks is simple; the appropriate sub-network 
divisions are those such that the number of connections internal to each sub-group are 
greater than the number of connections between sub-groups (Freeman, 1993).  In the 
context of a retail petroleum market, this would suggest that outlets in a sub-market are 
paying closer attention to each other than they are to outlets outside their sub-market.   
          Examining every possible sub-network is time consuming, and approaches to 
delineating sub-networks usually employ some form of rule to search for appropriate 
groupings; Girvan & Newman (2003 a,b) divide such approaches into two broad families; 
agglomerative and divisive.  Agglomerative approaches start with the empty network and 
add links based on some measure of similarity between each pair of nodes.  Every round 
of adding creates a new set of sub-networks, but there is nothing which favours one round 
over the next.  Divisive approaches (which they favour) start with all the links in place, 
and then remove links based on some rule; theirs is based upon the number of paths 
which flow through each link, and they advocate removing links with the greatest number 
of paths first.  Again, each round creates a new set of sub-networks, and there is nothing 
in the approach to favour one round over another. 
          Gould (1967), takes a much simpler approach nd is indeed the starting point for 
much of the literature on graph-cutting.  He uses the eigenvectors of the adjacency 
matrix.  Predating Bonacich (1972),12 he suggests that the first eigenvector, which 
contains all positive entries, might measure centrality (though he does not use the term).  
However, he goes on to suggest that clusters of positive and negative elements in each 
subsequent eigenvector might indicate subgroups in the network, indexed by the 
eigenvalue and with the largest (by absolute value) element in each subgroup 
representing its centre.  He illustrates his case with some road networks and gives 
                                                
11 Adjacency matrices are symmetric, zero-one matrix where a zero in the ijth position indicates that nodes i 
and j are not connected, and a one indicates that they are.  They are widely used in mathematical sociology 
as a basic mathematical representation of a network.  There is nothing, mathematically which requires one 
to use a zero-one matrix.  If, for example, the basic behavioural model used for connection utilised cross-
price elasticities, these could stand in for the zeroes and ones. 
12 Bonacich apparently discovered hi measure independently of Gould, and there is limited crossover 
between the geographers, who follow Gould, and the sociologists, who follow Bonacich. 
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plausible results.  His approach has been followed by other geographers, most 
particularly by his students, who use it widely in Africa (see Brookfield, 1973).  Cliff, 
Haggett & Ord (1979) use it to examine airline networks, whilst Boots (1985) shows how 
the approach gives consistent divisions for cellular networks.  O’hUallachain (1985) uses 
a variant of Gould’s methodology to reduce the dimensionality of input-output tables, and 
Thill (1998) uses it to group precincts into electora es.  Tinkler (1972, 1975) and Hay 
(1975) debate an extension by Tinkler (1972) that considers flows of information whilst 
Straffin (1980) explores the mathematical underpinnings of Gould’s (1967) work through 
the use of the Perron-Freobenius theorem. 
          The approach requires judgement to determin  which groupings of positive and 
negative entries represent appropriate sub-groups within the network, and it usually 
requires one to have a visual representation of the network as well to check results for 
reasonableness.  Moreover, beyond the first few eigenvectors, the signal-to-noise ratio is 
too high to extract much useful information.  However, it is a useful approach, and the 
amount of judgement required is arguably no more than t at required to determine which 
round of a divisive or agglomerative approach is bet.  We find that the second to sixth 
eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix of Figure Two pr vide a reasonable division into 
eight sub-markets.  The results are shown overleaf.13 
                                                
13 With 208 elements, the actual eigenvectors are too large to show here, but they are available from the 

























5.1 Testing the Sub-networks 
Since our submarket delineation process is judgemental, it behoves us to test the 
submarkets.  Girvan & Newman (2003 a,b) introduce a network-based measure they call 
modularity, which compares how many connections there are in each sub-group with the 
number which might be expected in a random network with the same number of sub-
groups and connections.  The measure ranges from zero to one, with a random network 
division scoring one-half.  Our network division scores over two-thirds, which indicates 
that it is reasonable.  Moreover, had we followed Girvan & Newman’s (2003a,b) divisive 
approach, we would have created roughly the same sub-groups as in Figure Three.  This 
should not, perhaps, be surprising, and likely signifies the mathematical links between 
eigenvectors and the agglomerative and divisive approaches of Girvan & Newman (2003 
a,b).  To be more robust, we need to step outside of the network framework. 
          Since this is an economic network, the most obvious way to step out of the network 
framework is to look at supply and demand.  Demand is simplest to explore, and we use 
the ABS (2006) data which is summarised at a city-wde level in Table Two, matching 
the post-codes of each outlet with post-code level data from the Census and then 
grouping the demand data by sub-market.14  The results provide some differentiation; the 
Western Suburbs market is, for example, distinctly richer, older and better educated than 
the rest, and the North-East market has relatively low socio-economic characteristics.  
However, the differences are not definitive.  If anANOVA test across all demand 
characteristics and all submarkets indicated all were different, one could safely conclude 
the submarkets were different.  Here, the result is not so clear cut, and it is unclear how 
much difference across characteristics is enough to deem that the submarkets are indeed 
different from a demand perspective.   
           We thus turn to the supply-side, and price.  If the outlets in a particular sub-market 
really are paying most attention to their submarket peers, then one would expect similar 
prices.  We test this pricing similarity by comparing how similar prices are within each 
submarket to how similar they are amongst like-branded outlets and, as a control, four 
random groups whose members are neither in the sameubmarket nor carry the same 
brand.  We could have tested amongst many different submarket groupings, aiming for 
optimality.  However, this would not really involve stepping outside the network, so 
instead, we use a counterfactual which has been widely used in the literature to collect 
outlets; branding.  Wang (2009), for example, shows how price increases are very closely 
related across outlets with the same brand in Perth 
          The obvious tool to test similarity is anANOVA test.  However, the volatility of 
the prices for all outlets is such that such a test provides no clear results at all; on average, 
almost all of the groupings (the eight sub-markets, the nine brands and the four random 
groups) pass the ANOVA tests and might hence be seen as equally valid.  Indeed, it is 
very hard to distinguish any differences between outlets using ANOVA, and thus we turn 
from comparing averages and variances to looking at the price paths in more detail. 
          To do this, we utilise an approach based on that suggested by Brillinger (1975) and 
used by Bartels (1977) to explore regional unemployment in Holland.  The approach 
relies upon examining the eigenvalues of the cross-c herency matrix for each group in 
                                                
14 This thus assumes that all demand is local, but we hav  no data on where actual demand comes from on a 
station-by-station basis and thus this is perhaps the best that one can do. 
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(brands, submarkets and random).  The coherency between any two outlets shows the 
degree of linear relationship between the magnitudes of their power spectra at the 
relevant frequency band of the spectrogram; the degree to which each element in the pair 
has the same amount of its total variance explained by cycles of a particular length.15 
          As Brillinger (1975) points out, the eigenv ctors of the cross-spectral matrix (using 
the cross-coherency matrix normalises the results) gives the closest result of any mapping 
from the smaller space described by the frequency data to the larger space described by 
the original data.  It is thus the best way to reduce the dimensionality of a problem 
involving a comparison of a large number of pairs of outlets to one where comparisons 
are between groups of outlets.  The spectral density matrix of this mapping mechanism 
has the eigenvalues of the cross-coherency matrix down the main diagonal and zeroes on 
the off-diagonal elements.16  Thus, the key to the analysis is to examine the rel vant 
eigenvalues; the closer these are to zero, the bettr is the mapping and thus the more 
cohesive is the relevant subgroup. 
          The analysis of the cross-coherency matrix eigenvalues involves these steps: 
• Firstly, we undertake an auto-spectral analysis (see Figure One) and ascertain the 
cycles with the most power and hence the most important lags for each of the 208 
stations. 
• Secondly, we regress these lags (which differ for each outlet, but usually contain the 
seventh and tenth lags) against price for each outlet, and collect the residual vector.  
Coherency analysis is undertaken using this residual vector to avoid auto-correlation 
from introducing bias to results (Chatfield, 2006). 
• Thirdly, having found the coherency between each pair in each of the nine brand 
groups, eight sub-market groups and four random groups, we arrange these into 
symmetric matrices.  Each of the 21 groups has 42 such matrices; one for each 
frequency band analysed. 
• Fourthly, we reduce the amount of data to be analysed.  There are 42 frequency bands 
for each of the 21 groups, but the first 12 comprise more than 80 percent of the 
variance in the average outlet, so we consider only these 12.  Moreover, each 
coherency matrix has as many eigenvalues, as there ar  outlets in that group.  We take 
only sufficient of the eigenvalues to explain 90 percent of the variation in each of the 
coherency matrices. 
• Finally, we take a weighted average for each of the eig nvalues (weights being the 
proportion of the 90 percent of variance each comprises) to give us a single score for 
each group at each frequency band. 
          The results of this rather involved procedure are shown in Figure Four.  There is 
clearly a wide dispersion of scores, with the branding groups exhibiting much more 
diversity than the sub-markets.  There are also not many differences between the various 
groupings for longer-term cycles but, over the shorter cycles of roughly a week, there is 
much greater variation.  Importantly, the branding groupings appear to be above the sub-
                                                
15 The auto-spectra are examined under pricing above, wh re we create spectrograms with 42 frequency 
bands.  Chatfield (2006), Brillinger (1975) or Granger & Hatanaka (1964) provide further details on 
coherency, phase and gain, the three elements of cross-spectral analysis, and the formulae used to calculate 
coherency in this analysis are taken from Granger & Hatanaka (1964, Chapters Five and Six). 
16 Under certain assumptions that seem reasonable to assume hold here, see Brillinger, 1975, pp. 344-5. 
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market groupings in most cases at these frequencies, suggesting, albeit weakly, that sub-
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FreewayNorth Fremantle Curt in CityCentral
Melville Northeast Midland WesternSuburbs
Caltex Shell BP Gull
Peak Mobil Liberty Caltex-Woolworths
 
Figure Four: Brillinger Analysis Results 
 
          As a straight average across all frequency bands, the four randomised groups 
scored 0.684, whilst the sub-market groupings scored 0.636 and the branding groupings 
scored 0.687.  If this is weighted by the power of the relative frequency band in 
explaining total variance for the average outlet across the whole sample, then the 
averages are 0.717, 0.685 and 0.724 respectively.  There are differing numbers of outlets 
in each of the branding and submarket groupings, and if the (unweighted) average 
frequency scores for each grouping are themselves weighted by the number of elements 
in that grouping, then the weighted average scores f r ub-markets and branding groups 
are 0.628 and 0.690 respectively.   
          It is difficult to assess the statistical significance of the differences between each of 
the average values above, or between each of the coherency curves shown in Figure Four, 
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unless one makes some rather heroic assumptions concerni g the distribution of each 
after being subjected to the various procedures outlined above.  However, it does not 
seem completely unreasonable to suggest that, based upon the procedure above, the sub-
market grouping of outlets does perform better, albeit marginally so, in explaining the 
degree to which prices are similar within a group than does the branding grouping which, 
in general, does no better than a random collection of stations.  That is not to say, 
however, that all brands are equal; BP and (more paticularly) Liberty, have pricing 
which is as similar as or more so than the best of the sub-market groupings.  Nor is it to 
say that each sub-market is equal; the Western Suburbs and (to a lesser extent) the 
Freeway North sub-markets do not have particularly similar pricing compared to the 
other sub-markets. 
6. Conclusions 
Understanding the structure of competition within a m rketplace can often be difficult.  
At an anecdotal level, there may be considerable understanding of who competes with 
whom, but translating this into something formal which can be used in further analysis is 
more difficult.  Here, we present a methodology fordoing so which relies upon 
constructing a network to summarise the structure of competition in the network based on 
bilateral interactions at the local level.  We show how this network can be cut, and outline 
some useful summary statistics which can be used in analysis.  In further work (Bloch & 
Wills-Johnson, 2010c), we utilise the summary statiics in a regression analysis to 
explore how market structure influences pricing.   
          The methodology outlined herein contains four very broad steps: 
• Define a behavioural rule for bilateral interaction. 
• Draw the network of bilateral ties and developing summary statistics. 
• Cut the network to allow network structure to defin sub-markets. 
• Test the submarkets for similarity before further use. 
          The last step is not strictly necessary, but it is a useful way of ensuring that the 
analyst is on the right track.  Here, it also shows that local competition is important in 
determining retail gasoline prices; potentially more so than branding.  This suggests, in 
turn, that a focus on brands as the sole driver might be misplaced.  The same test could 
also be used to compare different formulations for local markets, potentially (although it 
would be very time-consuming) finding the optimal one.  The second, third and fourth 
steps are not dependent upon the nature of the behaviour l rule described in the first step.  
For illustrative purposes, we have described the behavioural rule we have used for 
interaction between two retail petroleum outlets.  However, provided any replacement 
rule allows the analyst to deem two nodes (here, retail petroleum outlets) as being in 
competition with each other, and thus gives grounds for linking them in Step Two, the 
behavioural rule can be replaced. 
          The approach outlined here is very flexible and might find application anywhere 
where spatial competition or product differentiation means that a network is a useful way 
of looking at the structure of competition.  Apart from academic studies, this means it 
might be a useful adjunct to procedures used to determine markets in antitrust analysis 
and economic regulation.  It is thus an approach wit  broader academic and potential 




Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006, 2006 Census of Population and Housing, ABS, 
Canberra. 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2007, Petrol Prices and Australian 
Consumers: Report of the ACCC inquiry into the price of unleaded petrol, ACCC, 
Canberra, accessed 29th October 2009 from 
<www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/806216>. 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2008, Monitoring of the Australian 
petroleum industry: Report of the ACCC into the prices, costs and profits of unleaded 
petrol in Australia, accessed 10th February 2010 from 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/854720>. 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2009, Monitoring of the Australian 
petroleum industry: Report of the ACCC into the prices, costs and profits of unleaded 
petrol in Australia, accessed 10th February 2010 from 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/906872>. 
Bartels, CPA 1977, ‘The structure of regional unemployment in the Netherlands: An 
exploratory statistical analysis’, Regional Science & Urban Economics, vol. 7, pp. 103-
35.  
Bloch, H & Wills-Johnson, N 2010a, A Simple Spatial Model for Edgeworth Cycles, 
SSRN Working Paper 1558746, accessed 25th February from 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1558746>. 
Bloch, H & Wills-Johnson, N 2010b, The Shape and Frequency of Edgeworth Price 
Cycles in an Australian Retail Gasoline Market, SSRN Working Paper 1558747, 
accessed 25th February from <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1558747>. 
Bloch, H & Wills-Johnson, N 2010d, Gasoline Price Cycle Drivers: An Australian Case 
Study, SSRN Working Paper 1558766, accessed 25th February from 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1558766>. 
Bonacich, P 1972, ‘Factoring and weighting approaches to status scores and clique 
identification’, Journal of Mathematical Sociology, vol. 2, pp. 113-20. 
Bonacich, P 1987, ‘Power and centrality: A family of measures’, American Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 92, pp. 1170–82.  
Boots, BN 1985, ‘Size effects in the spatial patterning of non-principal eigenvectors of 
planar networks’, Geographical Analysis, vol. 17, issue 1, pp. 74-81.  
Borgatti, SP & Everett, MG 2005, ‘A Graph-theoretic perspective on centrality’, Social 
Networks, vol. 28, pp. 466–84. 
Borgatti, SP, Everett, MG & Freeman, LC 2002, Ucinet for Windows: Software for Social 
Network Analysis, Analytic Technologies, Harvard, Massachusetts. 
Brillinger DR, 1975, Time Series, Data Analysis and Theory, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
New York. 
Brookfield, HC 1973, ‘On one geography and a Third World’, Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers, vol. 58, pp. 1-20 
Burt, RS 1992, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts. 
Burt, RS 2000, ‘The Network Structure of Social Capit l’ RI Sutton & BM Staw (eds) 
Research in Organizational Behavior, vol. 22, Elsevier Science, Greenwich, 
Connecticut, pp. 345–423.  
 19 
Burt, RS 2002, ‘The Social Capital of Structural Holes’, MF Guillen, R Collins, P 
England & M Meyer (eds.), The New Economic Sociology: Developments in an 
emerging field, Russell Sage, New York, pp. 148-90. 
Burt, RS 2005 Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Chatfield, C, 2006, The Analysis of Time Series: An introduction (6th ed), CRC Press, 
Boca Raton Florida. 
Cliff, AD, Haggett, P & Ord JK 1979, ‘Graph Theory and Geography’, RJ Wilson & LW 
Beineke (eds.) Applications of Graph Theory, Academic Press, London, pp. 293-326. 
Davidson, S 2008, ‘Secret econometric business: Watching Fuelwatch and the ACCC’, 
Agenda, vol. 15, issue 4, pp. 5-18. 
Edgeworth, F 1925, ‘The pure theory of monopoly’ in F. Edgeworth, Papers Relating to 
Political Economy, MacMillan, London, pp.111-42. 
Freeman, LC 1993, ‘Finding groups with a simple genetic algorithm’, Journal of 
Mathematical Sociology, vol. 17, issue 4, pp. 227-41. 
Girvan, M & Newman, MEJ 2003a, ‘Finding and evaluating community structure in 
networks’, Physical Review E, vol. 69, pp. 026113. 
Girvan, M & Newman, MEJ 2003b, ‘Community structure in social and biological 
networks’ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 99, issue 12, pp. 
7821–6. 
Gould, P 1967, ‘The geographical interpretation of eigenvalues’, Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers, vol. 42, pp. 53-85. 
Granger, CWJ & Hatanaka, M 1964, Spectral Analysis of Economic Time Series, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey. 
Granovetter, M 2005, ‘The impact of social structure on economic outcomes’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, vol. 19, issue 1, pp. 33-50. 
Hastings, J 2004, ‘Vertical relationships and competition in retail gasoline markets: 
Empirical evidence from contract changes in Southern California’, American Economic 
Review, vol. 94, issue 1, pp. 317-28.  
Hay, A 1975, ‘On the choice of methods in the factor analysis of connectivity matrices: A 
reply’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, vol. 66, pp. 163-7. 
Thill, JC 1998, ‘A note on the matrix formulation of gerrymanders’, Environment and 
Planning B: Planning and Design, vol. 25, pp. 495-505.  
Hoover, EM 1937, ‘Spatial price discrimination’, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 4, 
issue 3, pp. 182-91. 
Maskin, E & Tirole, J 1988, ‘A theory of dynamic oligopoly II: Price competition, kinked 
demand curves and Edgeworth Cycles’, Econometrica, vol. 56, issue 3, pp. 571-99. 
McBride, ME 1983, ‘Spatial competition and vertical integration: Cement and concrete 
revisited’, American Economic Review, vol. 73, issue 5, pp. 1011-22. 
O’hUallachain, B 1985, ‘Complementary linkages and the structure of regional 
economies’, Geographical Analysis, vol. 17, issue 2, pp. 130-42.  
Straffin, PD 1980, ‘Linear algebra in geography: Eigenvectors of networks’, Mathematics 
Magazine, vol. 53, issue 5, pp. 269-76. 
Tinkler, KJ 1972, ‘The physical interpretation of eig nfunctions of dichotomous 
matrices’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, vol. 55, pp. 17-46. 
 20 
Tinkler, KJ 1975, ‘On the choice of methods in the factor analysis of connectivity 
matrices: A reply’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, vol. 66, pp. 
168-71. 
United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations: Committees of 
Government Affairs (USSPSICGA), 2001, Gas Prices: How are they really set?, 
accessed 10th February 2010 from 
<http://www.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate12sh107.html>. 
Wang, Z 2009, ‘(Mixed) strategy in oligopoly pricing: Evidence from gasoline price 
cycles before and under a timing regulation’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 117, 
issue 6, pp. 987-1030. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
